ARGUMENTATION AND FALLACIES IN ARGUMENTATION:

INDIAN AND WESTERN PERSPECTIVE

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I have a keen interest to do research on the theories of argumentation for the following reasons: argumentation is not only required for establishing philosophical positions, but also itself is a part of our daily life. Nigrahasthānas occur in the context of argumentation. Hence I shall begin with a discussion on argumentation. Argumentation occur for various purposes, such as, if two parties dispute over a matter, then to clear the dispute both the parties participate in an argumentation. If there is disagreement or differences of opinion regarding any matter, then to clear those differences of opinion both the parties involved in argumentation. Victory and defeat are the purposes of argumentation.

The discussion of argumentation is present both in Indian and Western philosophy. Vādin and prativādin will be present in the process of argumentation. Now the question is whether dialogue process involving Vādin and prativādin are at all rule bounded? If so then anyone who breaks the rule will be defeated. Then the question remains whether with the detection of any defect in the process of argumentation, the debate will come to an end?

If so then vādin and prativādin must know the rules and if they aware of the rules of the argumentation they will be able to detect the fallacies of another's position. Similarly, they will able to avoid the fallacies in respect of establishing their own positions.

1. The role of vādin and prativādin in the context of argumentation are establishment of their own position.

2. Offering evidence to establish their own positions.

3. Proving the evidence as proper evidence or given the proof for his evidence.

4. Criticising or refuting the alternative position.

5. answering to the objection brought by the opponent against his own position.

All these are the activities of those persons who participate in the process of argumentation. While performing these activities one has to be guided by some rules and regulations. There are restrictions as to what he should and should not do. If a participant goes against the restrictions he fails to attain the desired goal. This failure encompasses his or her defeat.

So he must be aware of the rules and regulations. Sometimes the rules of argumentation are indirectly presupposed from the discussion of their defect arising. Sometimes defeat in an argumentation gives rise to a rule of argumentation.

Nigrahasthānas is a reason for defeat. Because, nigrahasthānas is a fallacy, which occurs in the context of argumentation. That is why in the context of argumentation the discussion of nigrahasthānas is important or relevant. So vādin and prativādin should know those fallacies or nigrahasthanas which occur in the context of argumentation. To embarrass the opponents sometimes vādin or prativādin intentionally try to find out any defect of the opponent's position from which it does not actually suffer. In that case the question is what would be the position of the said individual pointing pseudo- fallacies in the position of the opponent?

At this point a question questions arise: can debate leads to truth? What other additional purposes can it serves? Is argumentation linguistic by nature? What kind of languages should be used in the process of argumentation? Can argumentation always demand historical purvapakṣha? Can argumentation demand assembly? Will the debate come to an end if the debater succeeds in refuting of the opponent?

In Indian Context first *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* discusses about argumentation. It is a pre-buddhist text, which admits that women can also participate in debate.

In the post-upaniṣadic period of Indian Philosophy debates occur not only regarding the organized religion and ritualism of Vedic orthodoxy as well as regarding established social codes and moral norms. These debates sometimes degenerated, wrangling and bitter verbal fights. That is why may be Buddha in the Nikāyas tells his pupils to avoid fruitless debates.

LITERATURE SURVEY OF INDIAN CONCEPT OF ARGUMENTION

Satishchandra Vidyabhusana in his *A History Of Indian Logic, Ancient, Mediaeval, Modern*, says that in Buddhist philosophy *Milinda-pańha*(100 A.D) discusses about argumentation and nigrahasthānas, after that in *Kathāvatthuu*(255 B.C) discusses about argumentation,

not only that, then *Upāya-kauśalya-hṛdaya-Śāstra*(300 A.D.), *Vaidyalyaprakarana* which are wroted by Nāgārjuna(250-320 A.D.), clearly discusses nigrahasthānas. Subsequently Maitreya(400 A.D.) in his *Saptadaśha-bhūmi-Śāstra-yogācārya* discusses argumentation and nigrahasthānas, followed by a discussion about argumentation and rules of debate by Asanga in his *Abhidharmasamuchhaya* discusses about argumentation and the rules of debate. After few years Dharmakirti(635-650 A.D.) in his *Vadanyāya*, gives a systematic discussion of argumentation and nigrahasthānas.

Jaina philosophy also focuses on argumentation and nigrahasthānas. The jainā philosopher Akalańkadeva(755 A.D.) in his *Siddhi-viniścaya* offers a discussion about victory and defeat relating to argumentation. In this connection he gives a profound view of nigrahasthānas. After Akalaṇka, PrabhāChandra (825 A.D.) in his *Prameya-kamal-mārtaṇḍa* offers a brief criticism about the nyaya conception of nigrahasthānas. Prabha Chandra Vadidevasūri (1086-1169 A.D.) in his *Pramāna-nyaya-tattvālokālańkāra* discussed about argumentation. After few years, Hemchandra Sūri(1088-1172 A.D.) in his *Pramanmimaṇsa* criticizes nyāya conception of nigrahasthānas.

In nyāyā philosophy nyāyasūtra,bhāşya,vārtīka,etc discusses about nigrahasthānas. Among these texts, in my research paper I shall discuss nyayā conception of nigrahasthanās according to sūtra,bhāşya and vārtika, Buddhist conception of nigrahasthānas, after Dharmakīrti's Vadanyayā as he gives a systematic approach about argumentation and nigrahasthānas, and jainā conception of nigrasthānas as advocated by Prabhāchandra, Hemchandra Sūri, because like Dharmakīrti they provides a systematic approach of nigrahasthānas.

Apart from buddha and jaina philosophers Maddha-Vedantī Jayatirtha gives a criticisms of nyaya conception of nigrahasthānas.

Now the question is that why do Indian philosopher discuss about nigrahasthānas? The answer may be that except chārvaka rest of the Indian philosophical school are liberation oriented, for example if we look at nyāya philosophy we observe in *Nyāsūtra* authored by Gautama that it has been stated, the theoretical knowledge of Sixteen padārthas leads to liberation. And sixteen padarthās includes nigrahasthānas. That is why they discussed about argumentation and fallacies. Among the nine schools of Indian philosophy some astika and nastika schools systematically discussed about argumentation. Chārvaka, bouddha, jaina, are nastika whereas nyāya-vaiśeşika, samkhyā, yogā, mimaṇsa, vedanta are Astika School. Nyāya even being Astika School was interest to establish the Vedic position through critical consid-

eration. Naturally those schools who are not the follower of Vedā specifically buddha school are the opponents of nyāya school. Thus they were involved in argumentation to establish their own position.

After that, it can be said that, the question which previously raised that the process of argumentation process is at all rule bounded? The answer may be that some debate manuals admitted that the argumentation process should be rule bound; otherwise ordinary people may be misguided by a crafty debater into immoral and false beliefs. Therefore, some professional training in the art of debate is essential for a philosopher. That is why some Indian debate manuals directly discussed about the rules of debate, and some Indian debate manuals discussed fallacies which occur in the context of argumentation from which the the rules of debate are indirectly implied.

Now the question is that who will participate in the process of argumentation? According to some Indian debate manuals vādi, prativādi, madhyostho and assembly will participate in the process of argumentation. But in that case the question is whether the assembly are actively participate in argumentation or not? This question involves a further question whether there are any eligibility criteria to participate in argumentation process or not.

I want to incorporate the western concept of argumentation and the western concept of fallacies. Because I want to draw a comparison between Indian concept of argumentation and western concept of argumentation, as argumentation is not only a subject of discussion of Indian philosophy but it is also a subject of discussion of western philosophy. The Indian tradition and the western tradition both are concerned about the rules of debate, and the fallacies which occur in the context of argumentation. I want to compare those rules and fallacies, in this connection I intend to find out some similarities and dissimilarities of those theories; this subject of discussion (argumentation) is same for both the theories so this will be a comparative study. The points of difference also should be taken into consideration.

LITERATURE SURVEY OF WESTERN CONCEPT OF ARGUMENTATION

In this regard if we draw our attention towards the Western conception of argumentation we will see that first of all Plato gives a picture of debate procedure in *Meno*. Plato, a student of Socrates, gives a distinguishable form of dialectic. After Plato if we see the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle we will see that rhetoric is described as a counterpart of dialectic.

Now the question is: is the Indian conception of argumentation is at all rhetorical?

If we look at the modern period we observe that first H.P. Grice gives cooperative principle and conversational maxims regarding argumentation. Besides that Ralph Johnson's *Manifest Rationality*, Douglas Walton's *The New Dialectic*, Olbrechts-Tyteca's *The New Rhetoric*, Franz Van Emeren and Rob Grootendorst's *A Systematic Approach Of Argumentation, The Pragma-Dialectical Approach* discusses about the theory of argumentation.

Among these, according to *The New Rhetoric*, argumentation is totally audience-centric. On the other hand Johnson concerns about the evaluation of argumentation.

Apart from all these the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation which is developed by Prof. Emeren and Rob Grootendorst of the Amsterdam University is indeed an argumentation theory that is used to analyze and focus on the study of argument as product or purely communicative to study the entirety of an argumentation as an discourse activity. This theory concerns about the rules of debate.

Among this western literature I will discuss Aristotelian conception of rhetoric and the pragma-dialectical conception of argumentation. Because I am going to refer their view in relevant places to find out whether it bears some resemblance with the treatment of the said issue in a different tradition long back in India.

From the above account it may be evident that like some Indian philosopher's some western philosophers are also interested about the theory of argumentation. That is why they directly discussed about the rules of debate. And if any debater violates those rules he or she will be committed fallacies, and for that reason he or she will be defeated.

Now the question is whether fallacies which occurred in the context of argumentation are formal fallacies or informal fallacies? Because formal logic deals with formal fallacies and

informal logic deals with informal fallacies. Formal logic deals with syntax. On the other hand informal logic deals with the uses of argumentation schemes in a context of dialogue, an essentially pragmatic understanding.

It is also noticed that deceptive tactics used unfairly in argument to defeat an adversary in dialogue. The question remains is the process of argumentation gives the permission to the debater that he or she can utilize deceptive tactics to fulfil his or her aim?

AIM OF MY RESEARCH:-

Aim of my research is to find out the answers of the above questions which had been raised in this synopsis. As it is a comparative study so I want to find out some draw backs of those theories, not only that but I also find out some important perspective of those theories. As I previously said that nigrahasthān is a kind of fallacy, so I want to find out which kind of fallacy it is. To complete my research work in future I will see some other books and journals regarding this topic.

In my research paper I will follow qualitative method.

Tentative Chapter Division

1. The conception of nigrahasthānas according to Nyāya Sūtra.
2. The conception of nigrahasthānas according to Dharmakīrti
3. The conception of nigrahasthānas according to Prabhāchandra and Hemchandra Sūri.
4. The difference between rhetoric and the Indian conception of argumentation.
5. The difference between Aristotelian conception of argumentation and modern conception of argumentation and fallacies.
6. The difference between pragma-dialectical approach of argumentation and some Indian conception of argumentation.

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